Airbus Lowers A320neo Production Targets
Paris, France — Airbus on Thursday scaled back its narrowbody jet production ambitions, publicly calling out engine maker Pratt & Whitney for ongoing supply failures that have thrown the European planemaker’s ramp-up plans into disarray.
The world’s largest commercial aircraft manufacturer now expects to reach a monthly A320neo-family output rate of between 70 and 75 jets by the end of 2027, stabilizing at 75 per month after that. The previous target was a flat 75 per month by 2027 — a seemingly modest downgrade in raw numbers, but one that carries significant implications across the global aviation supply chain. Airbus currently produces around 60 narrowbody aircraft a month. In a statement that accompanied its full-year results, Airbus didn’t mince words. The company said Pratt & Whitney’s refusal to commit to the number of engines Airbus has ordered is directly weighing on 2026 guidance and the broader production trajectory. That kind of supplier-directed criticism from a company of Airbus’s stature is rare. It’s even rarer when delivered alongside an annual earnings release.
Strong Profits Amid Industrial Friction
Despite the production headaches, Airbus posted solid fourth-quarter numbers. Adjusted operating profit climbed 17% to 2.98 billion euros on revenue of 25.98 billion euros, which rose 5% year over year. Both figures topped analyst expectations of 2.87 billion euros in profit and 26.51 billion euros in revenue. Net income also beat consensus, landing at 2.58 billion euros — a 6% improvement.
For the full year of 2026, Airbus is guiding for approximately 870 commercial aircraft deliveries, up from 793 in 2025 but well below the roughly 907 units Wall Street had penciled in. The company is projecting adjusted EBIT of around 7.5 billion euros and free cash flow before customer financing of about 4.5 billion euros. The gap between market expectations and Airbus’s own forecast tells a story. Analysts had been pricing in a faster recovery. Airbus, confronted with the realities of its engine supply, is telling them to recalibrate.
The Pratt & Whitney Problem
The friction between Toulouse and East Hartford has been building for months. The two companies still haven’t concluded engine supply agreements for either 2026 or 2027 — deals that are typically locked in at least 18 months ahead of time. That absence creates a planning vacuum at a moment when Airbus needs certainty more than anything else.
Pratt & Whitney powers roughly 40% of the A320neo family with its PW1100G-JM geared turbofan engine. But that engine has been at the center of a rolling industrial crisis since 2023, when RTX disclosed a powder-metal contamination defect that could cause cracking in high-pressure turbine and compressor components. The resulting inspection campaign has touched hundreds of engines and is expected to run well into this year. The consequences have been punishing. By late 2025, industry data indicated that more than 800 GTF-powered aircraft were sitting in storage — roughly one-third of the entire GTF-equipped Airbus fleet. Some nearly new A321neos have been stripped for parts because the engines are now worth more than the airframe. Airline executives have called the situation a systemic design problem rather than a short-term hiccup.
Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury said during the earnings call that the company intends to enforce its contractual rights against Pratt & Whitney. But he acknowledged a quick resolution isn’t coming. Airbus, he said, would have to accept the reality for now. If Airbus was hoping its other narrowbody engine supplier might step in to fill the gap, that door appears closed. CFM International, the GE Aerospace and Safran joint venture that makes the LEAP-1A for the A320neo, signaled last week that it isn’t prepared to divert additional capacity toward Airbus. The company’s priority, CFM said, is meeting its existing supply commitments.
That leaves Airbus caught between two engine suppliers, neither of which can give it what it needs to hit maximum production speed. It’s a structural bottleneck that no amount of final assembly line efficiency can solve.
A Pattern of Disruption
This isn’t Airbus’s first brush with supply-chain turbulence. The company trimmed its delivery targets in 2022, 2024, and again in 2025 due to parts shortages and component quality issues. Most recently, a Spanish supplier’s defective fuselage panels — involving incorrect metal panel thickness on A320-family jets — forced another delivery forecast cut in December.
And the early data for 2026 doesn’t exactly inspire confidence. Airbus delivered just 19 aircraft in January, down from 25 in the same month last year. While January is always the lightest delivery month, analysts flagged the figure as notably soft. On the widebody side, the outlook is more stable. Airbus reiterated its targets of five A330neo deliveries per month by 2029 and 12 A350s per month by 2028. The company also lifted its A220 production forecast to 13 per month in 2028, citing integration benefits from its acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems facilities that produce wings for the smaller jet.
The Airbus-Pratt & Whitney standoff has become one of the defining industrial tensions in commercial aviation. Pratt & Whitney Commercial Engines President Rick Deurloo expressed confidence at the Singapore Airshow earlier this month that a deal would come together. RTX CEO Chris Calio struck a more measured tone in January, noting that the company had to balance demand from airlines with its ability to deliver, while pointing out that overall engine shipments rose 50% last year. But confidence and balance don’t put engines on assembly lines. And every month that passes without a supply agreement is a month Airbus can’t plan with full certainty — which means airlines waiting on new A320neos can’t plan with certainty either.
The question now is whether the engine supply chain can catch up to the demand cycle before the next disruption inevitably arrives.
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